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Abstract	
This	article	focuses	on	wine	counterfeiting	and	the	policing	of	fake	wines	in	mainland	China.	
Relying	on	rich	data	drawn	from	published	materials	and	open	sources,	 it	discusses	 three	
important	themes	in	relation	to	product	counterfeiting:	the	definitional	issue;	the	scope,	scale	
and	organisation	of	the	counterfeiting	business;	and	law	enforcement	against	product	piracy.	
The	 aim	 is	 to	 broaden	 our	 knowledge	 about	 the	 counterfeiting	 trade,	 to	 develop	 a	 clear	
understanding	of	the	illegitimate	market,	and	to	help	to	renew	countermeasures	that	not	only	
enable	the	exercising	of	tighter	control	over	the	counterfeiting	industry	but	also	disrupt	the	
illegal	 behaviours	 of	 counterfeiters.	 Rather	 than	 place	 emphasis	 on	 the	 protection	 of	
intellectual	 property	 rights,	 this	 article	 stresses	 public	 health	 concerns	 with	 regard	 to	
dangerous	counterfeit	goods	such	as	fake	wines.	Examining	wine	counterfeiting	within	the	
existing	analytical	framework	of	organised	crime	research,	this	article	contributes	to	analysis	
of	the	nature	of	product	counterfeiting	and	the	issue	of	policing	counterfeit	goods.	
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Introduction		
In	 the	 existing	 literature,	 counterfeiting	 activities	 are	 often	 presented	 in	 the	 category	 of	
intellectual	property	(IP)	crimes,	of	which	the	legal	basis	is	in	the	law	concerning	the	protection	
of	intellectual	property	rights	(IPRs).	Typically,	counterfeit	goods	are	films	and	sound	recordings,	
computer	 software,	 designer	 clothing,	 shoes	 and	 fashion	 accessories	 (Norman	 2014).	 For	
ordinary	consumers,	counterfeiting—often	associated	with	 imitating	 luxury	brands—seems	to	
link	with	 the	 fashion	 industry	 and	 the	middle‐class	 lifestyle,	 and	 the	word	 ‘counterfeiting’	 is	
somehow	glamorised.	In	fact,	counterfeiting	is	an	industry	that	is	driven	by	market	demand	and	
profits,	 and	 counterfeit	 goods	 can	 be	 ‘anything	 and	 everything’	 (Antonopoulos	 et	 al.	 2018).	
Despite	an	increase	of	academic	inquiries	into	product	counterfeiting	in	recent	years,	there	is	still	
a	need	to	develop	a	broader	and	deeper	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	illicit	trade,	due	to	its	
evolving	complexity.		
	
Literature	about	counterfeiting	embraces	a	wide	range	of	themes,	in	which	IPR	infringements	are	
often	central.	Consequently,	economic	losses	of	IPR	owners,	losses	of	state	tax	revenue	and	job	
losses	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 flow	 of	 ‘fake	 goods’	 are	 used	 as	 measures	 to	 assess	 the	 cost	 of	
counterfeiting	to	local,	regional	and	global	economy.	Accordingly,	the	counterfeiting	trade	has	a	
considerable	economic	impact	and,	therefore,	warrants	official	attention	(see,	for	example,	United	
Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime	 2014).	 Research	 has	 also	 suggested	 links	 between	
counterfeiting	and	organised	crime	(see,	for	example,	Gowers	2006;	Lowe	2006;	Reynolds	and	
McKee	 2010;	 Satchwell	 2004;	 Treverton	 et	 al.	 2009).	 An	 earlier	 ‘general	 criminological	
indifference’	 to	 IP	 crimes	 (see	 Anderson	 1999;	 Yar	 2005)	 may	 no	 longer	 be	 sustained.	 Yet,	
commodity	counterfeiting	is	not	a	high	priority	of	law	enforcement	agencies.	For	example,	in	the	
United	Kingdom	(UK),	it	is	not	named	by	Lynne	Owens—Director	General	of	the	National	Crime	
Agency—under	any	of	the	three	crime	fighting	priority	headings	of	vulnerability,	prosperity	and	
commodity	 (see	 National	 Crime	 Agency	 2017).	 This	 is	 perhaps	 because	 of	 other	 competing	
threats	(for	example,	the	sexual	exploitation	of	children,	firearms	smuggling,	cybercrime,	human	
trafficking	 and	 modern	 slavery).	 This	 is	 also	 possibly	 because	 product	 counterfeiting	 has	
traditionally	been	perceived	as	‘victimless’	(see	critiques	in	Anderson	1999;	Yar	2005).	The	fact	
is	that	counterfeiting	is	a	broad	and	complicated	problem:	apart	from	IPR	violations,	it	may	pose	
acute	threats	to	public	health	and	safety.	The	nature,	organisational	characteristics	and	potential	
harms	of	 the	 trade	 in	 dangerous	 counterfeit	 goods	need	 thorough	 investigation	 to	 gain	 fuller	
appreciation	of	the	scope	of	the	problem.		
	
This	article	 focuses	on	one	 type	of	dangerous	counterfeit	goods—fake	wines.	 It	uses	 the	wine	
counterfeiting	trade	in	China	as	a	single	case	study	to	discuss	three	important	themes	in	relation	
to	 product	 counterfeiting:	 the	 definition	 of	 counterfeiting;	 the	 scope,	 scale	 and	 social	 and	
operational	organisation	of	 the	counterfeit	business;	 and	 the	policing	of	 counterfeit	 goods,	 an	
important	 subject	 for	 academic	 research	 (Wall	 and	 Large	 2010).	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	
broaden	our	knowledge	about	the	counterfeiting	business,	develop	a	clear	understanding	of	the	
illegitimate	market,	and	help	to	renew	and	advance	countermeasures	that	not	only	enable	the	
exercising	 of	 tighter	 control	 over	 the	 counterfeiting	 industry	 but	 also	 disrupt	 the	 illegal	
behaviours	of	counterfeiters.	
	
The	definitional	issue	of	counterfeiting	
As	indicated	earlier,	IP	law	provides	the	legal	basis	for	prohibiting	counterfeiting	activities.	While	
there	 is	 little	 agreement	 on	 its	 precise	 definition	 (Bently	 and	 Sherman	 2014),	 ‘intellectual	
property’	usually	refers	to	a	bundle	of	rights	that	protects	applications	of	ideas	and	information	
which	have	commercial	value	(Cornish,	Llewelyn	and	Aplin	2013).	Thus,	IP	law	covers	a	number	
of	areas	of	law,	including	copyright	law,	patent	law	and	trademark	law.	Counterfeiting	commonly	
refers	to	acts	which	involve	infringement	of	others’	IPRs.	It	is	not	a	legal	term,	but	frequently	used	
in	both	legal	and	lay	contexts	(Yar	2005).		
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While	 counterfeiting	 is	 not	 defined	 in	 the	 law	 in	 many	 jurisdictions,	 a	 legal	 definition	 for	
‘counterfeit	 goods’	 is	 available	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 context.	 The	 ‘Border	 Measures	
Regulation’	(EU	Regulation	No.	608/2013	concerning	customs	enforcement	of	IPRs),	for	example,	
provides	 the	definition	of	 ‘pirated’	or	 ‘counterfeit’	 goods	under	Article	2(5)	 and	 (6):	handling	
‘counterfeit	 goods’	 infringes	 trademarks,	 whilst	 dealing	 with	 ‘pirated	 goods’	 involves	
infringements	of	copyright,	related	rights	and	design	rights.	Thus,	IP	infringement	covers	piracy	
and	 counterfeiting.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 infringement	 of	 some	 IPRs	 can	 be	 described	 as	
counterfeiting	 or	 piracy	 (Bainbridge	 2012).	 Often,	 ‘pirated’	 and	 ‘counterfeit’	 goods,	 and	
‘counterfeiting’	and	‘product	piracy’	are	interchangeably	used	(see,	for	example,	Norman	2014;	
Organisation	for	Economic	Co‐operation	and	Development	(OECD)	2016).		
	
Lin	 (2011)	 explained	 counterfeiting	 by	 dividing	 it	 into	 three	 types	 of	 infringements:	 the	
unauthorised	 use	 of	 a	 brand	 name	 or	 trademark;	 the	 use	 of	 names,	 designs	 and	 logos	 that	
intentionally	resemble	a	brand;	and	the	unauthorised	sale	of	legitimately	produced	brand	name	
goods.	Clearly,	IP	law	is	the	basis	of	this	classification	of	infringements.	In	fact,	it	is	now	accepted	
that	counterfeiting	causes	harms	beyond	IPR	infringements,	and	it	should	be	suppressed	not	only	
to	 protect	 legitimate	 traders’	 economic	 interests,	 but	 also	 to	 prevent	 consumers	 from	 being	
deceived	 into	 buying	 substandard	 goods	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 to	 protect	 people	 from	
consuming	dangerous	fake	goods	(Bainbridge	2012;	Gowers	2006).	This	view	has	received	formal	
recognition	in	some	jurisdictions.	In	English	law,	for	example,	certain	IP	crimes	are	designated	as	
serious	offences	under	the	Serious	Crimes	Act	2007	(UK)	to	address	the	seriousness	of	those	IP	
violations,	prevent	 the	 trade	 in	 counterfeit	 goods	 that	 endanger	public	health	and	safety,	 and	
punish	those	who	are	engaged	in	the	illegitimate	business.	In	China,	product	counterfeiting	gives	
rise	to	the	breach	of	a	variety	of	substantive	laws,	 including	the	trademark	law	and	consumer	
protection	law	as	well	as	criminal	law.		
	
Under	Chinese	Criminal	Law	1997,	product	counterfeiting	may	primarily	constitute	two	types	of	
offences.	One	is	the	unlawful	use	of	others’	registered	trademarks	(Sections	213‐215),	and	the	
other	is	the	production	of	counterfeit	(jia‐mao)	and/or	substandard	(wei‐lie)	products	(Sections	
140,	143).	The	first	category	outlaws	counterfeiting	trademarks,	of	which	an	offence	is	punishable	
by	up	to	seven	years’	incarceration,	whilst	the	second	category	concerns	public	health	and	safety,	
for	 which	 the	 maximum	 penalty	 is	 life	 imprisonment.	 Under	 the	 existing	 law,	 the	 sale	 of	
counterfeit	goods	is	also	a	criminal	offence	if	a	person	has	sold	or	offered	counterfeit	goods	for	
sale	 that	 exceed	 50,000	 yuan	 (about	 £5,700)	 (Section	 149).	 Furthermore,	 if	 the	 fake	 and	
substandard	products	concerned	are	toxic	and	have	led	to	deaths	or	serious	personal	injuries,	the	
death	penalty	is	available	(Section	144).	In	cases	concerning	counterfeit	foods	and	beverages,	the	
Food	Safety	Law	2009	is	usually	triggered.	It	aims	to	strengthen	food	safety	in	China	(Section	2)	
and	outlaw	bad	practices	in	food	production	chains	(Section	28).	Shu	and	Li	(2014)	point	out	that	
this	law	provides	substance	to	the	matching	criminal	law	provisions.		
	
Chinese	law	indicates	that	wine	counterfeiting	amounts	to	not	only	IPR	infringements	but	is	also	
a	 serious	 crime	which	undermines	 the	economic	order	of	 the	 socialist	market	 and	endangers	
public	 safety	 and	 health.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 wine	 counterfeiting	 may	 amount	 to	 ‘food	 fraud’.	
According	to	the	UK’s	Food	Standards	Agency	(2016),	food	fraud	is	‘a	dishonest	act	or	omission,	
relating	to	the	production	or	supply	of	food,	which	is	intended	for	personal	gain	or	to	cause	loss	
to	another	party’.	Therefore,	wine	counterfeiting	may	overlap	with	concepts	such	as	‘food	fraud’	
and	‘food	crime’	in	the	field	of	research	focusing	on	criminality	and	integrity	in	food	supply	chains	
(see,	for	example,	Elliott	2014;	Fassam	and	Dani	2017;	Olmsted	2016).		
	
In	order	not	to	complicate	the	definitional	issue	(which	remains	unsettled),	and	to	keep	in	line	
with	recent	counterfeiting	research	into	illegitimate	alcohol	(see,	for	example,	Lecat	et	al.	2017;	
Lord	 et	 al.	 2017;	 Shen	 and	 Antonopoulos	 2016;	 Vandagraf	 2015),	 this	 article	 discusses	wine	
counterfeiting	 in	 the	 broad	 context	 of	 organised	 crime	 research.	 However,	 in	my	 concluding	
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comments,	 I	 propose	 an	 extended	 working	 definition	 of	 counterfeiting	 by	 adding	 some	
behaviours	regarding	food	(wine)	fraud.		
	
The	scope,	scale	and	process	of	the	fake	wine	business	in	China	
The	wine	market	has	been	rapidly	growing	in	China	since	the	mid‐1990s.	The	number	of	wine	
manufacturers	was	around	130	in	1994	but	reached	more	than	600	by	the	beginning	of	the	new	
millennium	 (Zhong	 2002).	 Initially,	 wines	 were	 consumed	 mainly	 by	 urban	 youths	 and	 the	
middle‐aged	 and	 high‐salaried	 professionals	 in	 first‐tier	 (Beijing,	 Shanghai,	 Guangzhou,	
Shenzhen,	Tianjin)	and	second‐tier	(including	Dalian,	Qingdao,	Hangzhou,	Nanjing	and	Xiamen)	
cities	in	the	developed	coastal	regions.	In	the	1990s,	there	was	a	popular	saying:	‘Being	wen‐bao	
(having	 adequate	 food	 and	 clothing)	 one	 drinks	 liquor;	 being	 xiao‐kang	 (fairly	 well‐off),	 one	
drinks	 beer;	 and	 being	 fu‐yu	 (affluent),	 one	 drinks	wine’	 (Liu	 1998:	 46).	 Gradually,	 the	wine	
market	has	expanded	to	third‐tier	cities	and	to	some	rural	areas	in	China	(Li	et	al.	2007).	Now,	
the	wine	market	 is	 ‘booming’	 (Byrnes	 2013)	 and,	 accordingly,	 the	wine	 industry	 is	 ‘thriving’	
(Global	City	Media	2015).		
	
In	 the	 Chinese	wine	market,	 imported	wines	 are	 increasingly	 gaining	 popularity.	 In	 the	mid‐
1990s,	 foreign	 wines	 started	 to	 flood	 into	 China,	 mainly	 from	 France,	 Italy,	 Spain,	 Hungary,	
Portugal	 and	Australia.	 In	 recent	 years,	 it	was	 estimated	 that	 Europe	 exported	 nearly	USD$1	
billion	worth	of	wine	to	China	(Byrnes	2013),	and	imports	represented	more	than	30	per	cent	of	
the	1.9	billion	bottles	of	wine	 sold	 annually	 in	mainland	China	 and	Hong	Kong	 (Huang	2012;	
Zhang	et	al.	2013).	Unsurprisingly,	the	wine	counterfeiting	business	is	flourishing.	
	
In	 the	 1990s,	 copies	 of	 the	 top	 three	 branded	 Chinese	 wines—Zhangyu,	 the	 Great	 Wall	 and	
Dynasty—as	well	as	some	top‐end	foreign	wine	brands	were	discovered	(Huang	2012).	It	was	
revealed	in	2013	that	just	under	50,000	bottles	of	Lafite	were	imported	to	China	annually,	but	
around	 two	 million	 bottles	 of	 ‘Lafite	 wine’	 were	 sold	 (Zhang	 et	 al.	 2013),	 demonstrating	 a	
counterfeiting	phenomenon	that	is	not	unusual	in	the	global	wine	market	(Lecat	et	al.	2017).		
	
Due	to	its	clandestine	nature,	gauging	the	scale	of	the	wine	counterfeiting	business	is	difficult.	
Official	statistics	are	unavailable.	According	to	one	journalist	account,	in	2015,	30	per	cent	of	all	
alcohol	in	China	was	counterfeit	(The	Guardian	2015).	With	wines,	it	was	estimated	in	2002	that	
counterfeits	comprised	57	per	cent	of	the	total	amount	of	wine	(400,000	tons)	sold	in	the	country	
annually	(Wu	and	Wang	2002).	This	proportion	is	believed	to	have	risen	since	then,	with	Bartman	
(2013)	assessing	that,	a	decade	later,	over	70	per	cent	of	the	wines	sold	in	China	were	not	original:	
in	other	words,	they	were	fakes	(see	also	Shen	and	Antonopoulos	2016).	French	wines	seem	to	
be	particularly	 targeted:	one	source	 suggested	 that	one	out	of	every	 two	bottles	of	 top‐brand	
French	wines	sold	in	China	was	fake	(American	Public	Media	2015);	another	suggested	there	was	
at	least	one	counterfeit	for	every	authentic	bottle	of	French	wine	(Mustacich	2015).		
	
It	should	be	noted	that	these	numbers	are	rough	estimates	and	‘impressionistic’	(Yar	2005)	and,	
while	not	true	reflections	of	the	scope	and	scale	of	the	wine	counterfeiting	business,	they	seem	to	
be	 consistent	 with	 the	 anecdotal	 evidence.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 popular	 TV	 series—Let’s	 Get	
Married—a	bottle	 of	 fake	Lafite	was	presented	 as	 genuine	 (Sina	News	 2013).	 Together,	 these	
numbers	and	examples	indicate	a	significant	economic	market	of	illegitimate	wines,	about	which	
no	comprehensive	knowledge	is	available.	Lecat	and	colleagues	(2017:	96)	argue	that	 ‘the	key	
issue	in	the	fight	against	counterfeiting	is	to	have	a	broad	awareness	of	the	whole	supply	chain	in	
the	wine	industry’.	I	add	that	it	is	also	salient	to	identify	the	organisational	characteristics	of	the	
wine	counterfeiting	industry	and	the	everyday	activities	of	counterfeiters.	In	this	paper,	this	is	
done	by	examining	the	wine	counterfeiting	process.	
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The	process	of	wine	counterfeiting	
Generally	 speaking,	 the	 counterfeiting	 process	 of	 most	 products	 primarily	 consists	 of	
manufacturing	 (including	 labelling	 and	 packaging),	 importation‐exportation	 (if	 applicable),	
internal	transport	and	distribution	(including	sales)	(see,	for	example,	Shen,	Antonopoulos	and	
von	Lampe	2010).	Wine	counterfeiting	is	no	exception.	Several	stages	in	the	wine	counterfeiting	
process	are	worth	noting.		
	
Manufacture	
The	choice	of	methods	for	manufacturing	counterfeit	goods	is	determined	by	a	number	of	factors,	
including	 the	 level	 of	 start‐up	 capital,	 expected	 quality	 of	 the	 fakes,	 availability	 of	 product	
knowledge,	 skills	 and	 technology,	 and	 costs.	 Existing	 literature	 suggests	 that,	 in	 wine	
counterfeiting,	refilling	of	genuine	empty	bottles	of	high‐end	brands	is	a	common	method.	It	is	
cheap,	does	not	require	any	special	skills	and	can	be	done	manually	(see,	for	example,	Shen	and	
Antonopoulos	2016).	This	method	involves	the	reuse	of	recycled	original	bottles,	to	which	usually	
genuine	 labels	 are	 still	 attached.	 Using	 original	 bottles	 makes	 it	 easy	 to	 deceive	 unaware	
consumers.	 Relatedly,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 ‘extraordinary	 demand’	 for	 empty	bottles	 of	 famous	
wines	 (Taylor	 2016;	 Vandagraf	 2015)	 and	 this	method	 of	 deception	 explains	why	 a	 buyer	 in	
Beijing	paid	2,900	yuan	(about	£330)	for	a	used	bottle	of	Lafite	Rothschild	(Moore	2011).		
	
Re‐labelling	 is	 another	 common	 method	 which	 involves	 replicating	 bottles	 or	 labels	 of	 the	
genuine,	usually	cheap,	brands.	For	example,	counterfeiters	will	replace	the	label	on	the	bottle	of	
Charles	Shaw	with	that	of	Castel	in	order	to	sell	the	fake	Castel	at	a	high	price.	In	a	police	raid	in	
Jiangsu,	 investigators	 saw	 several	 individuals	washing	 off	 the	 original	 labels	 on	 the	 imported	
cheap	wines	at	the	premises	of	an	international	trading	company,	where	the	counterfeit	labels	of	
top‐end	foreign	wine	brands	were	also	discovered	(Editorial	2012).		
	
Furthermore,	 labelling	 is	 also	 frequently	 used	 in	 fake	 wine	 production.	 In	 the	 counterfeiting	
industry,	bai‐ban	(literally	‘blank	board’,	meaning	unbranded	and	unlabelled	products)	are	often	
produced.	They	are	subsequently	‘branded’	with	counterfeit	labels	of	genuine	brands	according	
to	 order	 or	 demand	 (Guo	 2002;	 Ye	 2000).	 CCTV	 (2010)—China’s	 state	 television	 channel—
reported	 that	 realistic	 fake	 labels	 and	 other	 packaging	materials	 (for	 example,	 certificates	 of	
product	origin,	year	of	production	and	quality	verification)	were	widely	available	on	the	black	
market	(see	also	Fu	et	al.	2016).		
	
It	appears	that,	compared	with	traditional	wine‐producing	countries,	faking	labels	and	packaging	
materials	 is	 much	 easier	 in	 China	 because	 the	 majority	 of	 Chinese	 consumers	 as	 well	 as	
counterfeiters	do	not	have	much	wine	knowledge,	nor	do	they	know	much	English	or	any	other	
foreign	language	(Yi	2011).	People	typically	have	no	idea	what	the	authentic	product	looks	like.	
Consequently,	 even	 obvious	 spelling	mistakes	 and	 other	 erroneous	 details	 on	 the	 labels	 and	
packaging	may	not	appear	as	fakes	to	these	consumers.	For	the	same	reason,	counterfeiters	may	
simply	make	up	brand	names	to	label	their	fakes	(Sun	and	Yao	2004),	and	such	behaviour	does	
not	 usually	 violate	 anyone’s	 IPRs.	 Boyce	 (2012)	 observed	 that	 wine	 counterfeiters	 often	 use	
invented	brand	names	and	addresses	relating	to	places	abroad	to	claim	a	foreign	appellation	for	
wines	which	are,	in	fact,	made	in	China.	Consumers’	lack	of	wine	knowledge	has	been	exploited	
by	 local	 counterfeiters	 as	 well	 as	 overseas	 unethical	 entrepreneurs.	 Along	 with	 legitimate	
European	wine	exporters,	European	counterfeiters	are	increasingly	targeting	China’s	flourishing	
wine	markets	(Byrnes	2013).	
	
Product	 counterfeiting	 is	 clearly	 profit‐driven.	 Accordingly,	 whichever	 methods	 are	 used,	
profitability	is	what	matters	to	counterfeiters.	Existing	data	show	that,	while	fake	wines	may	be	
of	high	quality	and	professionally	imitated	fakes	are	hard	to	distinguish	from	the	genuine,	more	
typically,	fakes	are	made	of	poor	quality	or	diluted	wine	and	sold	as	if	they	are	genuine	products	
of	which	they	are	copies	(Editorial	2012).	Counterfeit	wines	may	be	made	of	a	mixture	of	water,	
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wine	 juice	 or	 edible	 alcohol,	 colourant,	 fragrant	 essences	 and	 other	 chemical	 ingredients	
including	thickening	agent	and	preservative	(Wang	2013).	These	additives	have	little	or	no	wine	
content	and	thus	are	essentially	creating	‘false’	wines.	In	the	worst	case,	the	chemical	ingredients	
used	are	health	threatening	(Editorial	2009).	Frequent	consumption	of	poor	quality	or	false	wines	
potentially	leads	to	long‐term	health	consequences	and	even	personal	injuries.		
	
Exportation‐importation		
Imported	wines	are	preferred	to	domestic	products	in	China	(Zhejiang	Daily	2012).	As	a	result,	
wines	with	a	foreign	label	are	usually	marketed	at	a	good	price	and	sell	well.	Thus,	foreign	wines	
are	 frequently	 counterfeited.	 Counterfeit	wines	 of	 foreign	 appearance	may	be	 imported	 fakes	
from	overseas	as	well	as	locally	produced	‘imports’.		
	
Some	fake	wines	are	made	overseas	for	the	illegitimate	wine	market	in	China.	They	can	be	ready‐
made	fakes,	bottled—often	unlabelled—low‐end	wines	and	cheap	unbranded	bulk	wines.	While	
the	quality	of	imported	wines	varies,	usually	substandard	products,	known	as	yang‐la‐ji	(foreign	
garbage)	(Wang	2013;	Zhong	2002;	Zhu	2003),	are	shipped	to	China	and	subsequently	bottled	
and	 labelled	or	re‐labelled	 to	 ‘make’	 imported	wines.	Some	counterfeiters	have	been	 found	to	
achieve	customs	clearance	by	forging	documentation	(Editorial	2012).		
	
Existing	literature	(see,	for	example,	Fu	et	al.	2016;	Zhong	2002)	indicates	that,	mostly,	cheap,	
unbranded	bulk	wines	have	been	supplied	to	China.	Sometimes,	overseas	wine	makers	have	used	
spoiled	 grapes—that	 is,	 grapes	 not	 fit	 for	 consumption—to	 produce	 wine	 for	 export.	 These	
imports	have	needed	re‐processing,	by	way	of	adding	chemicals,	to	remove	mouldy	smells	and	
improve	the	colour.	Often,	the	alcoholic	component	has	been	considerably	diluted	in	the	lengthy	
international	 transport	 process,	 and	 the	 deteriorated	 imports	 have	 been	 blended	with	 edible	
alcohol	 and	 various	 chemicals	 to	 improve	 their	marketability.	 Commonly,	 colourant	 has	 been	
added	 into	white	wine	 to	make	 it	 appear	 to	be	 red	wine	 (Zhong	2002).	 Consequently,	with	a	
mixture	of	ingredients,	the	components	of	these	wines	are	hard	to	identify	(Fu	et	al.	2016).	These	
imported	wines	are	clearly	a	health	concern.	According	to	Zhong	(2002),	such	substandard	cheap	
imports	have	been	estimated	to	comprise	80	per	cent	of	the	market	share	in	China,	an	even	higher	
estimate	than	those	presented	earlier.	A	Chinese	wine	expert	revealed	that	some	legitimate	wine	
manufacturers	have	also	used	these	types	of	imports	because	they	were	very	cheap	(about	£456	
per	ton),	whilst	domestic	grown	grapes	were	expensive	due	to	a	shortage	of	vineyards	(Zhong	
2002).		
	
Along	 with	 imported	 fakes,	 ‘imported	 wines’	 may	 be	 faked	 in	 China.	 Apart	 from	 labelling	 as	
explained	 earlier,	 counterfeiters	 may	 technically	 turn	 domestic	 wines	 into	 ‘imports’	 in	 the	
Customs	 Special	 Supervision	 Zones	 (CSSZs).	 The	 CSSZs	were	 established	 in	 2012	 to	 promote	
international	trade.	They	are	essentially	special	economic	zones	managed	mainly	by	provincial	
customs	authorities.	In	a	CSSZ,	goods	are	subject	to	simplified	customs	procedures,	tax	waivers	
and	 lax	 inspections	 (The	 Government	 of	 China	 2012).	 Zhang	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 observed	 that	 the	
system	has	been	abused	by	unethical	entrepreneurs	who	have	created	the	‘one‐day	tour’	method	
to	‘magically	create’	‘imported	wines’	within	a	day.	Domestic	wines,	once	in	a	CSSZ,	are	dealt	with	
as	if	they	are	imports	and	cleared	for	distribution	as	imported	wines	in	internal	markets.	This	
illegitimate	practice	is	akin	to	that	identified	in	the	counterfeiting	business	in	the	EU	(see	Hall	and	
Antonopoulos	 2016):	 counterfeiting	 entrepreneurs	 make	 use	 of	 the	 special	 economic	 zones	
where	the	relaxed	policing	and	customs	infrastructure	help	facilitate	the	counterfeiting	activities,	
such	as	falsification	of	documents,	to	avoid	interception	of	the	merchandise	by	the	authorities	
(OECD	 and	 EU	 Intellectual	 Property	 Office	 2017.	 The	 question	 is	 how	 the	 counterfeit	 goods	
initially	entered	the	CSSZs.	Is	it	a	side	effect	of	the	economic	policy	that	aims	to	boost	the	import‐
export	trade,	a	result	of	loopholes	in	practice,	or	corruption?		
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Distribution	and	sales		
Existing	 data	 show	 that,	 like	 legitimate	 products,	 fake	 wines	 are	 usually	 distributed	 through	
various	 channels	 and	 sold	 in	 all	 kinds	 of	 wholesale	 and	 retail	 outlets,	 including	 online	
marketplaces	such	as	Taobao,	a	Chinese	website	for	online	shopping	similar	to	Amazon	and	eBay.	
Brand	name	foreign	wines	are	often	sold	at	high‐priced	nightclubs,	karaoke	bars	and	other	top‐
end	entertainment	 facilities.	Zhang	(2012)	observed	that	 Internet	vendors	willingly	 facilitated	
sales	of	counterfeit	wines	and	spirits.	Additives	such	as	 flavouring	and	colouring	essences	are	
available	 online,	 where	 they	 are	 expressly	 advertised	 as	 wine‐making	 ingredients.	WeChat	
messaging	 and	 QQ	 chatrooms—Chinese	 equivalences	 of	 Facebook	 or	 WhatsApp—are	 now	
commonly	used	to	trade	in	counterfeit	goods	(Editorial	2015).		
	
Identified	cases	indicate	the	difficulties	in	tracing	the	origin	and	travel	of	counterfeits	because	of	
the	vastness	of	the	country	and	the	complexity	of	the	counterfeiting	business.	As	fake	goods	are	
typically	made	to	order,	storage	prior	to	sale	is	not	necessary,	and	counterfeiters	tend	not	to	keep	
sales	 records	 (China	News	 2014).	 Online	 sales	 further	 complicate	 law	 enforcement	 in	 several	
ways.	One	way	is	that	the	existing	law	is	vague	in	regards	to	online	trading	and,	in	practice,	no	
measures	 are	 available	 to	 enable	 effective	 routine	 inspection	 to	 police	 online	 marketplaces	
(Editorial	2015).	Consequently,	they	appear	to	be	a	free	trade	zone	for	counterfeiters.		
	
In	China,	it	is	not	uncommon	for	unethical	entrepreneurs	to	fill	eye‐catching	bottles	with	poor	
quality	wines,	package	the	wine	products	in	elegant‐looking	gift	boxes,	and	sell	them	at	a	high	
price.	Doing	 so	may	not	necessarily	 infringe	others’	 IPRs	but	may	 still	 be	highly	 profitable.	 A	
recent	case	showed	that	it	costs	less	than	100	yuan	to	make	this	type	of	fake	wines	but	the	retail	
price	could	be	as	high	as	3,000	yuan	(Editorial	2017).	These	counterfeits	of	what	appear	to	be,	
based	 on	 packaging	 and	 price,	 high	 quality	 end	 products	 are	 typically	 intended	 to	 deceive	
consumers.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	wine	 counterfeiters	 also	 target	 ‘deliberate’	 consumers	who	 are	
driven	by	the	tension	between	various	consumption	needs	and	affordability.	These	consumers	
often	choose	to	buy	fake	high‐end	brand	name	wines	at	cheap	prices	to	present	them	as	gifts	to	
relatives	and	friends,	usually	on	special	occasions,	so	as	to	appear	more	affluent	and	generous.	
This	is	illustrated	by	the	notorious	‘Shanye	fake	wine	movement’	in	China2.	Thus,	for	Jiang	(1994),	
consumers’	 vanity	 created	 a	 demand	 in	 the	 illegitimate	wine	market.	 Although	 the	 fake	wine	
business	can	be	highly	profitable	(Zhong	2002),	profitability	depends	on	a	variety	of	factors	(see	
detailed	discussion	in	Antonopoulos	et	al.	2018).		
	
A	recent	study	found	fake	Chinese	liquor	from	China	was	not	being	supplied	to	overseas	markets	
(Shen	and	Antonopoulos	2016),	possibly	due	to	insufficient	demand.	However,	several	isolated	
incidents	 were	 published	 in	 the	 popular	 media	 where	 counterfeit	 wines	 seized	 by	 Chinese	
customs	were	 intended	 for	 consumers	 in	 the	United	States	and	Britain,	 and	 there	was	 fear	of	
counterfeit	wines	of	Chinese	origin	finally	making	their	way	abroad	(Global	City	Media	2015).	
Apart	from	this,	little	evidence	suggests	the	flow	of	fake	wine	from	China	to	other	countries.	Nick	
Bartman,	a	counterfeit‐specialist	 lawyer,	concluded	that	few	of	the	fake	wines	in	China	are	for	
export	 and	 wine	 counterfeiting	 is	 solely	 China’s	 domestic	 problem	 (Boyce	 2012).	 For	 Wang	
Zemin,	Deputy	 Secretary‐General	 of	 the	 China	Wine	Association,	 China’s	wine	market	 is	 vast.	
Thus,	there	is	no	need	for	wine	makers	to	endeavour	to	sell	their	products	abroad	(Yi	2011).	This	
should	apply	to	the	illegitimate	wine	trade,	too.		
	
The	policing	of	counterfeit	wines		
As	suggested	earlier,	China	does	seem	to	have	comprehensive	and	strict	laws	to	curb	the	wine	
counterfeiting	business.	However,	the	problem	persists.	Several	difficulties	have	been	identified	
in	 the	 policing	 of	 counterfeit	 wines,	 including	 weak	 law	 enforcement,	 an	 ‘inadequate	
administrative	apparatus’	(Morcom	2008)	that	hampers	effective	and	efficient	implementation	of	
the	law,	and	an	unclear	administrative	structure	in	the	alcohol	industry	(Shen	and	Antonopoulos	
2016).	Following	enactment	of	the	Chinese	Food	Safety	Law	2009,	an	attempt	has	been	made	to	
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develop	 a	 framework	 that	 enables	 the	 exercising	 of	 tighter	 controls	 over	 the	 food	 industry,	
including	the	alcohol	trade.		
	
Administrative	structure	and	law	enforcement	players	under	the	Food	Safety	Law	2009	
Similar	 to	 other	 enforcement	 systems,	 such	 as	 the	 UK’s	 (see	 Lord	 et	 al.	 2017),	 a	 variety	 of	
authorities	 and	 agencies	 share	 responsibility	 for	 fighting	 alcohol	 counterfeiting	 in	 China,	
including,	inter	alia,	the	Ministry	of	Health	(MoH,	responsible	for	public	health),	China	Food	and	
Drug	Administration	 (CFDA,	 responsible	 for	 food	 safety),	 the	Anti‐Counterfeiting	Office	 (ACO,	
responsible	 for	 IPRs)	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Public	 Security	 (MPS,	 responsible	 for	 criminal	
investigation).	Figure	1	illustrates	the	administrative	structure	for	the	enforcement	of	the	Food	
Safety	Law	2009,	which	includes	scrutiny	of	the	alcohol	industry.		
	
	
Figure	1:	Structure	of	food	safety	administration	in	China	
Notes	
1. The	CFDA	was	established	in	2013	and	subsequently	became	the	executive	body	of	the	State	Council’s	Food	Safety	
Committee	(SCFSC).		
2. The	CFDA,	the	General	Administration	of	Quality	Supervision,	Inspection	and	Quarantine	(GAQSIQ)	and	the	State	
Administration	 for	 Industry	 &	 Commerce	 (SAIC)	 are	 enforcement	 authorities	 under	 direct	 leadership	 of	 the	 State	
Council	(SC).		
3. The	 ACO	 is	 a	 department	 within	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Commerce	 (MoC).	 Strictly	 speaking,	 it	 is	 not	 part	 of	 the	
administrative	structure	concerning	food	safety	but	may	be	involved	(in	some	places	take	the	lead)	in	joint	enforcement	
actions	against	alcohol	counterfeiting.		
	
As	Figure	1	shows,	the	State	Council’s	Food	Safety	Committee	and	the	MoH	are	the	core	in	food	
safety	administration.	The	SCFSC,	which	was	established	in	2010	and	initially	led	by	Li	Keqiang,	
China’s	 Deputy	 Premier	 at	 that	 time	 and	 who	 is	 China’s	 Premier	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 is	 a	
regulatory	 body	 for	 food	 safety.	 It	 is	 now	 under	 the	 directorship	 of	 the	 current	 first	 Deputy	
Premier.	The	creation	of	this	public	office	headed	by	such	a	high‐ranking	official	appears	to	show	
the	commitment	of	the	central	government	to	food	safety.	Along	with	it,	the	MoH	(also	known	as	
the	 National	 Health	 Commission)	 takes	 primary	 responsibility	 for	 ensuring	 food	 safety,	 and	
functions	 to	 coordinate	 all	 public	 bodies	 responsible	 for	 the	 supervision,	 inspection	 and	
investigation	in	the	food	industry.		
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Other	State	Council	jurisdictions	also	play	a	part	in	the	administration	and	enforcement	of	food	
safety.	 For	 example,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 is	 responsible	 for	 overseeing	 agricultural	
products	 (the	 start	 of	 the	 food	 supply	 chain);	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Industry	 and	 Information	
Technology	and	the	MoC	govern	food	safety	in	production,	distribution	and	catering	services	(the	
end	of	the	food	supply	chain).	Several	agencies	under	direct	leadership	of	the	SC	are	enforcement	
authorities	 in	their	particular	 fields	of	administration,	as	Figure	1	shows,	 including	CFDA	(the	
executive	 body	 of	 SCFSC),	 State	 Administration	 for	 Industry	 and	 Commerce,	 and	 General	
Administration	of	Quality	Supervision,	Inspection	and	Quarantine.	They	are	usually	called	upon	
and	led	by	the	MoH	to	jointly	investigate	major	incidents	that	involve	serious	breaches	of	the	Food	
Safety	Law	2009	and	that	may	have	a	national	impact.	A	similar	administrative	framework	is	set	
up	locally,	in	which	the	local	government	plays	a	leadership	role	(Sections	4,	5	of	the	Food	Safety	
Law	2009).		
	
Hence,	efforts	have	been	made	to	create	a	new	enforcement	model	to	ensure	food	safety	in	China.	
This	model	attempts	to	clearly	define	the	leadership	and	to	bring	together	multiple	authorities	
and	agencies	at	both	central	and	local	levels.	So	far,	little	evidence	is	available	to	indicate	whether	
the	 new	model	 has	 worked	 to	 effectively	 respond	 to	 alcohol	 counterfeiting.	 Instead,	 gaps	 in	
practice	have	been	identified	(Sun	2010;	Zhao	and	Chu	2010).	This	is	not	surprising	if	we	consider	
the	common	problems	that	appear	in	other	countries,	such	as	in	the	UK,	where	similar	regulatory	
systems	have	been	adopted,	in	which	responsibility	lies	with	multiple	authorities	with	competing	
agendas	(for	example,	Lord	et	al.	2017).	In	the	case	of	China,	there	are	further	challenges,	as	we	
shall	see	later	in	this	section.		
	
Compared	 with	 the	 regulatory	 structure	 for	 food	 safety	 control,	 the	 administrative	 and	
enforcement	system	for	IPR	protection	is	far	less	clear.	Under	the	MoC,	there	is	a	national	Anti‐
Counterfeiting	Office	(formally	known	as	 ‘Office	 for	the	Leading	Team	for	Fighting	against	IPR	
Infringements	and	Counterfeit	and	Substandard	Goods’,	or	‘da‐jia‐ban’	abbreviated	in	Chinese).	
The	 agency	 appears	 to	 lead	 and	 coordinate	 national	 anti‐counterfeiting	 operations.	 In	 some	
regions,	the	municipal	governments	have	established	their	own	da‐jia‐ban	to	play	a	similar	role	
at	the	local	level	(Editorial	2007).		
	
Anecdotal	evidence	suggests	that	SAIC	and	its	local	agencies,	known	as	the	Administrative	Bureau	
of	Industry	and	Commerce	(ABIC),	are	in	part	responsible	for	dealing	with	product	counterfeiting,	
including	 alcohol	 counterfeiting.	 ABICs	 carry	 out	 inspections,	 aiming	 for	 prevention	 and	
detection.	They	seem	to	have	certain	investigative	powers.	Sun	and	Yao	(2004)	observed	that	a	
local	ABIC	in	Xinjiang	conducted	a	variety	of	investigative	activities—overt	and	covert—and,	on	
one	occasion,	the	investigators	took	the	suspects	to	a	hotel	room	for	questioning.		
	
Likewise,	 GAQSIQ,	 formerly	 known	 as	 National	 Administration	 of	 Quality	 and	 Technology	
Inspection	(NAQTI),	is	a	national	authority	which	directs	its	local	bureaus	to	undertake	quality	
supervision	and	inspection.	Counterfeit	and	substandard	goods	may	be	detected	in	routine	and	
reactive	 inspections,	 and	 individuals	 and	 businesses	 involved	 may	 be	 administratively	
sanctioned.	The	GAQSIQ	also	leads	national	crackdowns	on	counterfeiting	goods.	For	example,	it	
launched	an	enforcement	campaign	targeting	alcohol	counterfeiting	in	2012,	jointly	with	six	other	
central	 government	 authorities.	 Locally,	 following	 a	 tip‐off,	 the	 Dantu	 Bureau	 of	 Quality	 and	
Technology	 Inspection	 (BQTI)	 in	 Jiangsu	 province	 carried	 out	 a	 reactive	 inspection,	 which	
resulted	in	the	detection	of	a	wine	counterfeiting	workshop	and	seizure	of	11,208	bottles	(nine	
types)	of	fake	foreign	wines	(Editorial	2012).		
	
In	cases	of	alcohol	counterfeiting,	apart	from	ABIC	and	BQTI,	other	local	agencies,	such	as	Bureau	
of	Commerce	(formerly,	 ‘Bureau	of	Economy	and	Trade’),	 local	Food	and	Drug	Administration	
and	the	police,	often	participate	in	anti‐counterfeiting	actions.	In	serious	counterfeiting	incidents,	
the	police	usually	take	the	lead.	Where	imports	and	exports	are	involved,	the	customs	authorities	
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typically	play	a	central	part	in	law	enforcement	operations,	and	Chinese	customs	authorities	have	
been	praised	for	their	anti‐counterfeiting	efforts	(see,	for	example,	Global	City	Media	2015).		
	
In	addition,	when	there	appears	to	be	an	increase	in	alcohol	counterfeiting	or	when	illicit	business	
activities	peak	prior	to	the	festival	seasons,	such	as	the	Chinese	New	Year,	there	are	national	and	
local	anti‐alcohol	counterfeiting	crackdowns,	what	Dimitrov	(2009)	refers	to	as	‘campaign	style	
enforcement’.	In	these	campaigns,	usually,	the	police	lead	joint	actions	with	other	agencies	to	raid	
counterfeiting	workshops,	make	arrests	and	confiscate	 fake	goods	and	counterfeiting	facilities	
(Xinhua	News	2017).	
	
It	is	hard	to	deny	that	the	Chinese	government	has	made	considerable	efforts	in	the	fight	against	
illicit	alcohol	and	that	pressure	on	counterfeiters	from	law	and	administration	enforcement	in	
China	is	high.	However,	the	illegitimate	business	seems	to	hold	its	ground.	There	are	a	number	of	
challenges	for	law	enforcement	agencies;	some	are	shared	with	other	countries,	whilst	others	are	
China’s	own.		
	
Actions	against	wine	counterfeiting	and	remaining	problems	
Research	indicates	that	a	system	which	consists	of	multiple	agencies,	with	clear	leadership	and	
collaboration	 and	 cooperation	 strategies	 is	 essential	 for	 the	 successful	 policing	 of	 food	 fraud	
(Elliott	2014;	Fassam	and	Dani	2017).	This,	of	course,	encompasses	wine	counterfeiting.	In	law	
enforcement	practice,	a	common	problem	facing	counterfeiting‐affected	countries,	as	indicated	
earlier,	is	the	lack	of	coordination	in	multi‐agency	work.	As	we	have	seen,	in	China,	a	number	of	
agencies	assume	anti‐counterfeiting	responsibility	in	relation	to	the	alcohol	industry,	but	a	clear	
division	of	 responsibilities	between	 them	 is	 lacking.	Consequently,	no	one	knows	exactly	who	
does	what,	 and	 this	 is	 illustrated	 in	 a	 popular	 saying:	 one	 agency	 cannot	manage	 it	whereas	
multiple	agencies	cannot	manage	it	well	(Liu	2013).	
	
Another	 shared	 problem	 links	 to	 departmentalism	 which	 may,	 in	 practice,	 result	 in	
administrative	 vacuums.	 Under	 departmentalism,	 each	 department—authority	 or	 agency—
works	 to	achieve	 their	own	objectives,	 from	their	own	perspectives	and	 in	 their	own	 fashion.	
Nothing	seems	to	be	wrong	as	these	departments	are	regulated	entities	striving	to	follow	the	laws	
that	govern	them	(Kramer	2004).	However,	this	may	leave	gaps	when	each	department	works	
only	to	achieve	its	own	goals,	but	fails	to	go	beyond	that	and	act	towards	the	common	goal	(Jiao	
1998).		
	
Usually,	 alcohol	 counterfeiting—and	 product	 counterfeiting	 in	 general—is	 a	 cross‐region	 and	
even	 cross‐border	 business.	 It	 thus	 requires	 local,	 regional	 and	 sometimes	 also	 international	
cooperation.	Information	sharing,	for	example,	helps	to	holistically	connect	supply	chains	in	the	
counterfeiting	trade,	which	allows	law	enforcement	to	work	seamlessly	(Fassam	and	Dani	2017).	
However,	information	sharing	is	not	always	possible	between	different	agencies	within	the	same	
jurisdiction	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Lord	et	 al.	 2017),	 let	 alone	 agencies	 in	different	 administrative	
regions.	This	is	also	a	shared	problem.		
	
There	are,	of	 course,	problems	specific	 to	China,	given	 its	unique	political,	 socioeconomic	and	
cultural	conditions.	One	such	problem	concerns	inconsistency	in	law	enforcement	and	sometimes	
‘capricious	 enforcement’	 (Dimitrov	 2009).	 Inconsistency	 in	 policy	 and	 practice	 appears	 to	 be	
commonplace	in	China	(Shen	2016a),	which	causes	confusion	and	sometimes	arbitrariness	in	law	
enforcement,	and	may	give	rise	to	legitimacy	concerns.	For	example,	da‐jia‐ban	 is	not	a	public	
body.	 Although	 the	 agency	 at	 both	 central	 and	 local	 levels	 often	 leads	 anti‐counterfeiting	
crackdowns,	it	is	not	empowered	to	conduct	investigations,	nor	does	it	have	authority	to	impose	
administrative	sanctions.	In	reality,	agencies’	scope	of	power	is	not	always	observed	and	the	rules	
are	not	always	strictly	followed	in	what	are	often	ad	hoc	anti‐counterfeiting	practices.		
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Past	 research	 has	 identified	 local	 protectionism	 as	 a	 problem	 associated	 with	 product	
counterfeiting	(see	details	in	Chow	2004;	Kramer	2006;	Lin	2011;	Shen	and	Antonopoulos	2016;	
Shen,	 Antonopoulos	 and	 von	 Lampe	 2010).	 The	 role	 that	 local	 protectionism	 plays	 in	 wine	
counterfeiting	is	well	illustrated	in	the	Changli	case,	in	which	the	illicit	business	was	apparently	
known	to	the	local	authority	but	 ‘overlooked’	because	it	was	viewed	to	have	boosted	the	local	
economy.	Along	with	fake	wine	makers,	the	enabling	local	businesses	also	grew	fast	by	supplying	
ingredients,	 packaging	 materials	 and	 accessories	 to	 the	 counterfeit	 businesses	 (Guangdong	
315.gov	 2011).	 With	 little	 incentive	 to	 do	 otherwise,	 some	 local	 authorities	 adopted	 a	 slack	
approach	to	implementing	and	enforcing	the	anti‐counterfeiting	and	food	safety	laws	(Liu	2013).		
	
Corruption	has	also	been	linked	with	the	counterfeiting	trade	(Dimitrov	2009;	Editorial	2007;	
Jiao	1998).	Ye	(2004)	went	 further	and	claimed	 that	counterfeiting	signals	corruption.	Xinhua	
News—China’s	state	news	agency—once	suggested	that	some	local	food	safety	authorities	turned	
fines	into	‘protection	fees’;	once	fines	were	paid,	the	counterfeiters	were	‘permitted’	to	carry	on	
illegitimate	production	(Guangdong	315.gov	2011).	Corruption	in	China	is	rampant	(Yang	2016)	
which	partially	explains	why	the	central	government’s	policy	cannot	be	fully	implemented,	and	
why	national	anti‐counterfeiting	crackdowns	may	not	have	a	real	impact	on	the	counterfeiting	
industry.		
	
Law	enforcement	on	 alcohol	 counterfeiting	 in	China,	when	applied,	 appears	 to	be	oppressive.	
Despite	the	remaining	problems,	it	 is	recognised	that	anti‐counterfeiting	practices	from	a	food	
safety	perspective	have	 improved	since	 the	new	 law	came	 into	 force	 (Liu	2013),	and	 that	 the	
alcohol	counterfeiting	industry	has	been	suppressed	to	some	extent	(Ye	2003).	However,	little	
hard	data	are	available	to	back	up	these	claims.		
	
Discussion	and	conclusion		
This	article	set	out	to	discuss	three	major	themes	in	relation	to	wine	counterfeiting	in	mainland	
China:	 first,	 the	 definitional	 issue	 of	 counterfeiting;	 second,	 the	 scope	 and	 scale	 of	 the	 wine	
counterfeiting	business	and	how	fakes	are	made	available;	and,	third,	the	policing	of	counterfeit	
wines.	 It	 has	 illustrated	 a	 complex	 and	 evolving	 nature	 of	 the	 counterfeiting	 trade.	 Thus,	 the	
definition	of	counterfeiting	requires	constant	revision	to	reflect	the	ever‐changing	characteristics	
of	the	‘second‐oldest	profession’	(Yang	2016)	in	today’s	globalised	capitalist	business	practice.		
	
The	 first	 theme	suggested	 that	 fake	wines	 in	 the	Chinese	market	 can	be	categorised	 into	 four	
types:	fake	brand‐name	wines	(for	example,	a	wine	is	made	identical	to	and	sold	as	that	of	Lafite);	
passing‐off	or	‘look‐alike’	(Vandagraf	2015)	wines	(for	example,	a	wine	is	made	to	mimic	Lafite	
but	uses	a	similar,	rather	than	identical,	brand	name);	misrepresented	wines	(for	example,	for	a	
higher	price,	a	newly	brewed	wine	is	misrepresented	and	sold	as	an	aged	or	vintage	wine,	or	a	
local	wine	is	offered	for	sale	as	an	import);	and	false	wines	(which	have	little	or	no	wine	content	
and	are,	in	fact,	not	wine).	The	first	two	categories	are	typical	knock‐offs	and	deliberately	trading	
in	 them	violates	others’	 trademark	 rights.	 The	 second	 two	 types	may	or	may	not	 involve	 IPR	
infringements	but	are	fraudulent	and	may	amount	to	crime	in	China	and	many	other	legal	systems	
including	 the	UK.	As	we	have	 seen,	 fakes—domestic	products	and	 imports—are	 frequently	of	
inferior	quality	or	even	made	of	chemicals	which	may	cause	long	term	and	perhaps	serious	health	
consequences.	The	article	indicated	that	wine	counterfeiting	overlaps	with	food	fraud	and,	like	
product	counterfeiting	in	general,	causes	a	wide	range	of	harms	that	go	far	beyond	IPR	violation.	
Essentially,	the	article	suggests	a	broader	working	definition	of	counterfeiting	which	extends	that	
of	 Lin’s	 (2011)	 by	 embracing	 illegitimate	 behaviours	 which	 are	 conducted	 in	 the	 everyday	
counterfeiting	business,	but	 involve	no	 IPR	 infringements,	 to	reflect	a	more	realistic	nature	of	
product	piracy.		
	
For	 the	 second	 theme,	 the	 article	 detailed	 some	 underlying	 and	 routine	 activities	 in	 the	
counterfeiting	 process	 (see	 also	 Lord	 et	 al.	 2017).	 No	 evidence	 suggests	 the	 involvement	 of	
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organised	crime	rings	in	the	wine	counterfeiting	trade,	and	the	illicit	economic	sector	in	China	
appears	 to	 be	 made	 up	 of	 individuals	 and	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises,	 similar	 to	 the	
counterfeiting	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 wine	 and	 spirits	 industry	 in	 the	 EU	 (see	 EU	 Intellectual	
Property	Office	2016).	In	line	with	the	existing	literature	(see,	for	example,	Antonopoulos	et	al.	
2018;	Hall	and	Antonopoulos	2016;	Lord	et	al.	2017),	this	article	noted	that	legitimate	companies	
also	occupied	the	‘dirty’	or	‘grey’	markets	(Edwards	and	Gill	2002).	At	the	same	time,	the	findings	
showed	that	wine	counterfeiting—as	with	product	piracy	as	a	whole—requires	a	certain	level	of	
social,	financial	and	operational	organisation.	In	the	illicit	trade,	just	like	in	the	legitimate	business	
world,	it	is	essential	for	individual	players	to	cooperate	and	conspire	(Edwards	and	Gill	2002).	
Thus,	 this	 article	 examined	wine	 counterfeiting	within	 the	 analytical	 framework	of	 organised	
crime	 research,	with	 a	 view	 to	 contributing	 to	 the	 careful	 and	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 problem	 (Levi	 and	 Maguire	 2004).	 A	 further	 reason	 to	 situate	 commodity	
counterfeiting	 in	the	context	of	organised	crime	 is	 to	persuade	policy	makers	 to	prioritise	 the	
illicit	 business	 on	 law	 enforcement	 agendas	 (see,	 for	 example,	 National	 Crime	 Agency	 2016,	
2017).	
	
Clearly,	the	counterfeiting	phenomenon	is	an	integral	part	of	capitalist	business	practice,	in	which	
market	 rule	 applies.	 China,	 among	 other	 countries	 in	 the	 developing	 world,	 has	 the	 ‘global	
reputation	as	a	“making	and	faking”	nation’	(Yang	2016:	3)	and	it	is	often	blamed	for	being	the	
largest	producer	of	counterfeit	goods	in	the	world	(OECD	2016).	However,	what	is	overlooked	is	
that	developing	countries	are	also	recipients	and	consumers	(Taylor	2016)	and,	thus,	victims	of	
the	global	counterfeiting	trade.	As	this	article	has	shown,	in	the	counterfeiting	world,	there	are	
no	real	cultural	barriers:	anyone	from	any	part	of	the	world	may	participate	in	product	piracy,	as	
long	as	the	individual	is	motivated	by	a	strong	economic	incentive	and	has	a	modest	amount	of	
start‐up	 capital.	At	 the	 same	 time,	what	 is	 also	 in	 common	 in	 any	part	of	 the	world—in	both	
developed	and	developing	economies—is	that	no	one	should	accept	counterfeit	goods	that	harm	
or	endanger	public	health	and	safety	(Pang	2008).	This	relates	to	the	third	theme	of	this	article.		
	
Alcohol	counterfeiting	is	a	viable	business	and	counterfeiters	change	their	strategies,	methods	
and	approaches	swiftly	to	maximise	profit	and	avoid	detection.	Thus,	the	cat‐and‐mouse	game	
between	policing	authorities	and	counterfeiters	is	predicted	to	continue	(Ye	2000).	From	a	law	
enforcement	perspective,	this	article	has	identified	a	number	of	challenges	in	anti‐counterfeiting	
practices.	 Some	 are	 shared—for	 example,	 those	 associated	 with	 multi‐agency	 areas	 of	
responsibility—whilst	 others	 appear	 more	 problematic	 for	 China,	 including	 weak	 law	
enforcement,	 local	 protectionism	 and	 corruption.	 These	 challenges	 often	 render	 anti‐
counterfeiting	crackdowns	to	‘loud	thunder	but	small	raindrops’	events	in	some	local	areas	and,	
at	the	national	level,	they	explain	why	anti‐counterfeiting	policy	and	practice	in	China	have	not	
had	a	significant	impact	on	the	counterfeiting	trade.		
	
At	the	policy	level,	as	the	article	has	shown,	the	central	government	is	committed	to	confronting	
the	counterfeiting	industry,	especially	from	a	public	health	perspective.	However,	in	the	market	
economy,	 entrepreneurial	 activities—including	 illegitimate	 business	 practices—are	 market‐
driven.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 as	 long	 as	 neoliberalism	 continues	 in	 China,	 it	 is	 hard	 for	 the	 state	 to	
effectively	 intervene	and	stop	 illegal	money‐making	methods,	 even	where	harsh	penalties	are	
available	(Shen	2016b).		
	
Compared	 with	 other	 social,	 legal	 and	 economic	 problems,	 product	 counterfeiting	 is	 still	 an	
under‐researched	area.	This	article	provides	insights	into	the	wine	counterfeiting	business	which	
were	 gained	 from	 the	 rich	 data	 drawn	 from	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 published	materials:	 research	
monographs,	 academic	 and	 specialist	 journals	 (for	 example,	 the	 China	 Anti‐Counterfeiting	
Report),	 official	 reports	 and	 other	 supporting	materials	 in	 open	 sources	 in	 both	 English	 and	
Chinese	 languages.	 It	 used	wine	 counterfeiting	 in	 China	 as	 a	 case	 study	 to	 piece	 together	 the	
disparate	parts	of	the	criminal	market	and,	therefore,	sheds	some	new	light	on	the	complex	and	
potentially	harmful	 trade	 in	dangerous	 counterfeit	 goods.	Despite	 the	usual	 limitations	of	 the	
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method	and	data3	(see	Shen	and	Antonopoulos	2016;	Shen,	Antonopoulos	and	von	Lampe	2010),	
the	 findings	 here	 have	 a	 wider	 application	 and	 are	 capable	 of	 providing	 policymakers	 and	
practitioners	with	an	evidence‐based	understanding	of	the	counterfeiting	trade	to	inform	policy	
and	practice	in	China	and	beyond.	It	is	hoped	that	more	rigorous	empirical	approaches	can	be	
taken	in	future	studies	to	gather	more	first‐hand	information	which	will	help	to	develop	‘a	clearer	
understanding	of	the	various	crime	scenes,	actors	and	their	resources’	(Levi	and	Maguire	2004:	
457)	in	the	illegitimate	business	sector.		
	
Finally,	given	the	current	nature	of	the	wine	counterfeiting	business	in	China,	whichever	national	
anti‐counterfeiting	measure	is	taken	is	unlikely	to	have	much	impact	on	global	wine	markets,	but	
may	direct	international	counterfeiters	to	other	locations	where	the	marketplace	is	less	regulated	
and	thus	more	susceptible	to	alcohol	counterfeiting.		
	
	
	
Correspondence:	Anqi	Shen,	Professor	of	Law,	Northumbria	Law	School,	Northumbria	University,	
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1	I	am	grateful	to	the	Faculty	of	Law	and	Crime	and	Justice	Research	Centre	at	Queensland	University	of	
Technology,	Australia,	for	funding	me	to	present	an	earlier	version	of	this	paper	at	the	Crime	and	Justice	
in	Asia	and	Global	South	Conference	(July	2017,	Cairns).	I	would	like	to	thank	the	audience	for	their	helpful	
feedback.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	the	anonymous	reviewers	for	their	comments.	
2	At the	beginning	of	the	new	millennium,	Shanye	wine—literally,	 ‘the	wine	made	from	grapes	grown	in	
wild,	mountainous	regions’	(vitis	amurensis)—rapidly	gained	popularity	in	China.	In	those	years,	Chinese	
wine	manufacturers	increasingly	turned	to	produce	Shanye	wines.	The	market	demand	also	attracted	a	
large	number	of	counterfeiters	(Dong	2002;	Wang	2002).	Dong	(2002)	reported	that,	in	Jilin	alone,	among	
more	than	200	Shanye	wine	‘manufacturers’,	only	about	ten	making	genuine	Shanye	wine.	To	boost	sales,	
counterfeiters	 adopted	 several	marketing	 strategies,	 including	making	 every	effort	 to	 create	 a	 luxury	
image	for	their	fake	products.	For	example,	they	offered	to	sell	cheap	gift	sets	of	Shanye	wines	to	attract	
low‐income	 consumers.	 In	 one	 gift	 set,	 counterfeit	 Shanye	wine	was	 contained	 in	 a	 small	 artistically	
designed	chunky	bottle,	which	was	elegantly	placed	in	a	little	basket	hand	made	with	white	reeds.	These	
counterfeit	products	met	the	need	of	many	of	those	who	wanted	to	buy	expensive	gifts	at	cheap	prices	
(Dong	2002).		
3	 The	major	 limitations	 of	 the	method	 include:	 the	 data	were	 drawn	 from	what	was	 available	 in	 open	
sources	at	the	time	of	the	research,	hence	there	is	a	‘generalisation	issue’;	the	information	that	the	article	
relied	 upon	was	 largely	 gathered	 from	cases	 that	were	 detected	by	 the	 authorities	 and	 subsequently	
publicised,	and	thus	‘successful’	counterfeiting	schemes	and	unreported	cases	were	not	included	in	the	
analysis;	and	it	is	possible	that	the	official	and	media	accounts	were	biased	towards	only	law	enforcement	
measures	and	performance	which	have	been	successful,	and	thus	failures	are	omitted.	
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